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CHAIDEZ V. UNITED STA TES: BREAKING OLD GROUND
ABSTRACT
In Padilla v. Kentucky, the United States Supreme Court held that
the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution requires defense
counsel to advise his or her noncitizen criminal client about the impact of
a guilty plea on the client's immigration status. When an attorney fails to
provide his or her client that advisement, that client is deprived the effec-
tive assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. In
Chaidez v. United States, the Supreme Court held that Padilla announced
a "new rule" and therefore relief based upon the holding of Padilla
would only be available prospectively. Defendants whose convictions
were final prior to Padilla, including Roselva Chaidez, could not bring
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel under Padilla and were there-
fore denied justice.
This Comment argues that the holding of Padilla was not a new
rule. Specifically, changes to immigration law enacted in 1996, not Pa-
dilla, triggered the right of noncitizen criminal defendants to advisement
about the immigration consequences of a guilty plea. Because of these
changes, Padilla was a straightforward application of the existing Strick-
land v. Washington test for ineffective assistance of counsel, applied to
new circumstances created by the 1996 changes in immigration law. Be-
cause Padilla did not announce a new rule, but only applied an existing
rule to new circumstances, the holding should have applied retroactively,
and Roselva Chaidez should have had her conviction vacated pursuant to
Padilla.
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INTRODUCTION
On December 3, 2003, Roselva Chaidez and Jose Padilla faced the
same dilemma. Both were lawful permanent residents of the United
States.' Each had pleaded guilty to a charge without understanding that a
guilty plea would result in deportation, as required by United States im-
migration laws passed in 1996.2 Neither Chaidez's nor Padilla's attorney
had provided their client with advisement about the immigration conse-
quences of her or his plea.
3
Ten years later, Chaidez and Padilla are in dramatically different
situations. A court has vacated Jose Padilla's conviction; although he still
faces the underlying criminal charges, he is no longer facing automatic
deportation.4 Roselva Chaidez, on the other hand, is not as fortunate; the
Supreme Court refused to recognize her rights and prevent her deporta-
tion.5 These very different results are not due to the factual differences in
the cases but rather the result of timing and inconsistent decisions by the
Supreme Court.
Three cases are critical to understanding the stories of Roselva
Chaidez and Jose Padilla. In Strickland v. Washington,6 the Court set
forth the test for determining what constitutes effective or ineffective
counsel in a criminal proceeding.7 Teague v. Lane8 provides the standard
I. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 359 (2010); United States v. Chaidez, 730 F. Supp. 2d
896, 898 (N.D. 111. 2010), rev'd, 655 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2011), affd, 133 S. Ct. 1103 (2013).
2. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 359; Chaidez, 730 F. Supp. 2d at 896.
3. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 359; Chaidez, 730 F. Supp. 2d at 904; Commonwealth v. Padilla, 253
S.W.3d 482, 483-84 (Ky. 2008), rev'd and remanded, 559 U.S. 356 (2010).
4. Padilla v. Commonwealth, 381 S.W.3d 322, 330-31 (Ky. Ct. App. 2012).
5. Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1113 (2013).
6. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
7. Id. at 687.
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for when a rule of criminal procedure applies retroactively.9 Padilla v.
Kentucky'0 recognizes a noncitizen criminal defendant's right to advise-
ment about the immigration consequences of a guilty plea.'
In Padilla v. Kentucky, the United States Supreme Court held that
after changes to immigration law enacted in 1996 expanded the number
of deportable offenses and nearly eliminated prosecutorial discretion, a
criminal defendant has the right to advisement about the immigration
consequences of a guilty plea.12 When a defense attorney fails to provide
a criminal defendant accurate information about the deportation ramifica-
tions of a guilty plea, the defendant has not received the effective assis-
tance of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.'3 A lack of effec-
tive assistance of counsel satisfies the first prong of the two-prong Strick-
land test that courts use to determine whether to vacate a criminal con-
viction. 14
Following the Padilla decision, the federal appellate circuits split on
whether the Padilla holding retroactively applies to final convictions.
5
The Third Circuit held that the Padilla rule applies retroactively, while
the Fifth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits held that it does not.16 Although
the circuits split on whether Padilla should apply retroactively, there was
unanimity that Teague provided the correct standard to apply in making
the determination; all of the circuits applied the Teague standard regard-
less of whether deciding either in favor of or against retroactivity.7 The
Teague standard appears straightforward: a decision that creates a new
rule is generally not retroactive; a decision that applies an old rule to new
circumstances is retroactive.18
In Chaidez v. United States,'9 the Supreme Court resolved the dis-
pute among the circuits by holding that Padilla announced a new rule
under Teague, and therefore did not apply retroactively.20 The Court held
that while the result in Padilla came from an ordinary application of the
8. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
9. Id. at 310.
10. 559 U.S. 356 (2010).
11. Id. at 374.
12. Id. at 363-64, 374.
13. See INS v. St. Cyr., 533 U.S. 289, 323 n.50 (2001); U.S. CoNST. amend. VI.
14. See Padilla, 559 U.S. at 366-67. The first prong is representation that falls below reason-
able professional standards; the second is likelihood of a different outcome absent the deficient
representation. Id. at 366.
15. Allison C. Callaghan, Comment, Padilla v. Kentucky: A Case for Retroactivity, 46 U.C.
DAVIs L. REV. 701, 703 (2012).
16. Id.
17. United States v. Amer, 681 F.3d 211, 212 (5th Cir. 2012); United States v. Chang Hong,
671 F.3d 1147, 1150 (10th Cir. 2011); Chaidez v. United States, 655 F.3d 684, 686 (7th Cir.
2011); United States v. Orocio, 645 F.3d 630, 635 (3d Cir. 2011), abrogated by Chaidez v. United
States, 133 S. Ct. 1103 (2013).
18. SeeTeague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989).
19. 133 S. Ct. 1103 (2013).
20. Id. at I113.
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established Strickland test, the decision to apply Strickland to any collat-
eral consequence of a conviction broke new ground and created a new
rule. Justice Kagan, writing for the majority, noted that Padilla
"breach[ed] the previously chink-free wall between direct and collateral
consequences. 22 This perceived breach was the basis for the Chaidez
Court's decision that Padilla constituted a new rule. The dissent, on the
other hand, argued the changes to immigration law in 1996 redefined
professional norms for defense counsel.23 The new professional norms
required defense counsel to advise noncitizen clients about the immigra-
tion consequences of a guilty plea under existing rules. These new pro-
fessional norms, in the dissent's view, were new circumstances, not a
new rule, and dictated the outcome of the Strickland test in Padilla mak-
ing the decision retroactive under Teague.
This Comment argues that the dissent in Chaidez was correct in de-
termining that the Padilla holding did not create a new rule. This Com-
ment further argues that Justice Kagan's wall between direct and collat-
eral consequences never existed in Supreme Court precedent prior to her
announcement of the distinction. To the extent it existed in lower court
precedent, the wall was not only chinked at the time of the Padilla deci-
sion but had a gaping hole regarding deportation. Finally, this Comment
will argue that Roselva Chaidez had the same right to advisement about
the immigration consequences of her guilty plea as Jose Padilla. When
the Supreme Court failed to recognize her right to advisement, Roselva
Chaidez suffered an injustice, and so did the Bill of Rights.
I. BACKGROUND
Padilla held that the Sixth Amendment requires defense counsel to
advise his or her noncitizen criminal client about the impact of a guilty
plea on the client's immigration status.24 In Chaidez, the Court held that
this duty constituted a new rule as defined by the Teague test and there-
25fore was not retroactive. Chaidez, as a result, was not entitled to have
her conviction vacated.26 This ruling is peculiar because Chaidez's guilty
plea came over a year after Jose Padilla's conviction. If Jose Padilla had
a Sixth Amendment right to information about the deportation conse-
quences of a guilty plea in 2002, how did Chaidez not have the same
right in 2003? To comprehend that determination, it is necessary to un-
derstand how the Court applied the Strickland test in Padilla and the
importance of the 1996 changes in immigration law.
21. Id. at I110-11.
22. Id. atI 110.
23. Id. at 1115 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
24. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 374 (2010).
25. Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. at 11 10-11.
26. See id. at I113.
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A. 1996 Immigration Law Changes
In 1996, Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Im-
migrant Responsibility Act 27 (IIRIRA) and the Antiterrorism and Effec-
tive Death Penalty Act 28 (AEDPA), which increased the number of de-
portable offenses.29 Among the changes brought by the 1996 laws was a
new definition of "aggravated felony, 3 ° specifically, reducing the quali-
fying sentence from five years to one year. The laws also "abolished
the Attorney General's authority to grant discretionary relief from re-
moval for all but a small number of offenses.32 This meant that nonciti-
zen defendants sentenced to one year or longer of incarceration automat-
ically qualified for deportation.
This new near certainty of deportation led the Padilla Court to rec-
ognize defense counsel's obligation to advise clients about how a guilty
plea could affect their immigration statuses.33 The Court held that be-
cause the new immigration laws made deportation an "integral part ... of
the penalty that may be imposed on noncitizen defendants,"34 the Sixth
Amendment applies to advisement about the deportation consequences of
a criminal conviction.35
The Padilla Court noted that after the 1996 changes in immigration
law, it had become the prevailing professional norm for defense counsel
to inform a noncitizen client about the ramification of a guilty plea on his
or her deportation status.36 These professional norms are the measuring
stick of Strickland, and the change in professional norms dictated the
outcome of the Strickland test in Padilla.37
B. Strickland v. Washington: What Constitutes Ineffective Assistance of
Counsel?
The Strickland Court established a two-prong test for determining
whether to vacate a criminal conviction due to ineffective assistance of
27. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub. L.
No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. & 18
U.S.c.).
28. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-132,
110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18, 22, 28, 40, & 42 U.S.C.).
29. Matthew A. Spahn, Comment, Padilla Retroactivity: A Critique of the Tenth Circuit's
Ruling That Padilla v. Kentucky Does Not Apply Retroactively to Cases on Collateral Review [Unit-
ed States v. Chang Hong, 671 F.3d 1147 (10th Cir. 2011)], 51 WASHBURN L.J. 767, 767-68 (2012).
30. Adriane Meneses, Comment, The Deportation of Lawful Permanent Residents for Old and
Minor Crimes: Restoring Judicial Review, Ending Retroactivity, and Recognizing Deportation as
Punishment, 14 SCHOLAR 767, 782 (2012).
31. Id.
32. Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1116 (2013) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing
Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 363-64 (2010)).
33. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 363--64.
34. Id. at 364.
35. Id. at 364, 366.
36. See id. at 367.
37. Id. at 366-67.
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counsel.38 The first prong examines whether the assistance counsel pro-
vided met current professional norms.39 Assistance of counsel is ineffec-
tive when the attorney's performance "falls 'below an objective standard
of reasonableness,' as indicated by 'prevailing professional norms."'
40
The Strickland Court identified professional norms as "American Bar
Association standards and the like. '41 Strickland's second prong deter-
mines whether the deficiency in the assistance of counsel caused preju-
dice significant enough to make a different outcome likely.42 A petitionerS- 43
must meet both prongs of the test to have a court vacate a conviction.
When changing professional norms dictate a decision under Strick-
land they establish a new duty for defense counsel without creating a
new rule under Teague.44 Over time, the Supreme Court has recognized
new standards for the effective assistance of counsel prong of the Strick-
land test.45 At the same time, the Court frequently holds that changes in
professional norms dictate the outcome of the Strickland test.' In Wig-
gins v. Smith,47 the Court held that Williams v. Taylor,48 which requires
defense counsel to conduct background investigations in certain cases,
did not create a new rule.4 9 In Roe v. Flores-Ortega,5 ° the Court held that
performance by counsel is ineffective when it deprives a defendant of an
appeal.5' In Rompilla v. Beard,52 the Court found defense counsel to be
ineffective because he did not investigate a client's prior convictions.
53
Each time, the Court held that the decision was not a new rule.54 In each
of these cases, the Court held that the professional norms of the time
dictated the outcome of the Strickland test, that the rules were not new,
and therefore the rules applied retroactively.
55
C. Padilla v. Kentucky Establishes a New Duty
Jose Padilla had lived in the United States for over forty years when
he pleaded guilty in 2002 to transporting marijuana.56 He was a Vietnam
38. Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1107 (2013).
39. Id.
40. Id. (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984)).
41. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688.
42. Id. at 687.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 784.
45. Spahn, supra note 29, at 782-84.
46. Id.
47. 539 U.S. 510 (2003).
48. 529 U.S. 362 (2000).
49. Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1115 (2013) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
50. 528 U.S. 470 (2000).
51. Id. at 477.
52. 545 U.S. 374 (2005).
53. Id. at 389-90.
54. Spahn, supra note 29, at 784.
55. See id at 782-84.
56. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 359 (2010); Commonwealth v. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d
482, 483 (Ky. 2008), revd and remanded, 559 U.S. 356 (2010).
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War veteran and lawful permanent resident of the United States.57 Provi-
sions of the 1996 immigration laws required his deportation as a result of
his decision to plead guilty to drug trafficking.58 After learning he was
eligible for deportation, Padilla filed a motion in state court for post-
conviction relief based on a Sixth Amendment claim of ineffective assis-
tance of counsel.59 Padilla claimed his attorney had told him he "did not
have to worry about immigration status since he had been in the country
so long."'6 Initially, the state trial court denied Padilla's request for re-
lief.6' Padilla appealed, and the state appellate court reversed the trial
court, vacating his conviction.62 Ultimately, the Kentucky Supreme Court
reversed the appellate court and reinstated the trial court order denying
relief.
63
Padilla appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.64 The
Court applied the Strickland test, found that Padilla had not received the
effective assistance of counsel, and held that a criminal defendant has a
Sixth Amendment right to advisement about the immigration conse-
quences of a guilty plea.65 The Court held that current professional norms
required defense counsel to provide information about the immigration
consequences of a conviction.6 6
D. Teague v. Lane: Is a Rule Retroactive?
Courts use the Teague standard to determine when a rule of criminal
procedure is retroactive.67 Teague holds that once a conviction is final, a
defendant cannot benefit from a subsequent ruling if that ruling announc-
es a new rule.6 8 However, if the ruling is merely an established principle
applied to new circumstances, it is not a new rule and the decision ap-
plies retroactively.69 The central question faced by the Chaidez Court
was whether to apply Padilla retroactively to Roselva Chaidez's convic-
tion.70 Teague defines a new rule as a decision that "breaks new ground,"
"imposes a new obligation" on the government, or is "not dictated by
[existing] precedent.",71 In order to determine if Padilla applied retroac-
tively, the Chaidez Court had to determine whether the Padilla decision
57. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 359.
58. Id. at 359, 363-4.
59. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d at 483.
60. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 485.
63. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d at 485.
64. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 360 (2010).
65. Id. at 360, 366, 374.
66. Id. at 367.
67. Id. at H107.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1105 (2013).
71. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 301 (1989) (emphasis omitted).
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"broke new ground," "imposed a new obligation" on the government, or
was "dictated by precedent."
II. CHAIDEZ V. UNITED STATES
A. Facts
Roselva Chaidez, originally from Mexico, obtained lawful perma-
nent resident status in the United States in 1977.72 Approximately twenty
years later, she pleaded guilty to two counts of mail fraud for helping to
defraud an automobile insurance company.73 Under the 1996 immigra-
tion laws, the two counts to which Chaidez pleaded guilty qualified as
"aggravated felonies" and, unbeknownst o Chaidez, triggered her depor-
tation under the 1996 laws.74 In 2004, Chaidez's convictions became
final.75
Five years later, Chaidez applied for United States citizenship.76
Chaidez's application alerted immigration officials of her convictions,
and the government initiated deportation proceedings against her.77 In an
attempt to avoid deportation, Chaidez sought to have her convictions
vacated by filing a writ of coram nobis with the Federal District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois. 78 Chaidez maintained that her attor-
ney never informed her of the immigration consequences of pleading
guilty, and at the time of her plea she was unaware of the deportation
implications of her plea.79 Chaidez claimed that her attorney's failure to
inform her of the deportation implications of her guilty pleas amounted
to ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment.
80
Chaidez filed an affidavit that she would not have accepted the plea bar-
gain if she was aware that she could face deportation as a result.81 The
district court determined this affidavit satisfied the prejudice prong of the
Strickland test.82 Chaidez filed her corrected petition for relief with the
district court just one week before the Supreme Court decided Padilla.3
72. Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. at 1105.
73. Id. at 1105-06.







81. United States v. Chaidez, 730 F. Supp. 2d 896, 904 (N.D. Ill. 2010), rev'd, 655 F.3d 684
(7th Cir. 2011), affd, 133 S. Ct. 1103 (2013).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 898. Chaidez needed to submit a corrected petition explaining why she had waited
so long to file. Id. at 898, 904.
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B. Procedural History
After learning she faced deportation, Chaidez petitioned the district
court to have her convictions vacated on Sixth Amendment grounds.
84
The district court ruled that the Padilla decision was an ordinary applica-
tion of Strickland, did not break new ground, was not a new rule,85 and
therefore applied retroactively and applied to Chaidez's claim.86 The
district court granted Chaidez's motion and vacated her conviction, find-
ing that Chaidez's attorney had not informed her of relevant deportation
issues and that Chaidez's lack of knowledge created prejudice sufficient
to believe that the outcome could have been different had the information
been provided to Chaidez.
87
The Government appealed and the Seventh Circuit reversed, finding
that Padilla did announce a new rule.88 The Seventh Circuit reasoned
that the Supreme Court had never before required defense counsel to
advise a client about a collateral consequence of a guilty plea.89 The Sev-
enth Circuit held that Padilla violated the accepted "distinction between
direct and collateral consequences.'" 90 Judge Williams of the Seventh
Circuit dissented, arguing that Padilla only applied the established
Strickland test to an attorney's duty to inform a client about deportation
issues after the enactment of the 1996 changes in immigration law.9'
C. Majority Opinion
Justice Kagan wrote the majority opinion for the Court in which
Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Breyer, and Alito
joined.92 In analyzing whether Padilla has retroactive effect, the majority
applied the Teague standard.93 Justice Kagan acknowledged that under
Teague, garden-variety applications of Strickland to new circumstances
do not produce new rules and are therefore retroactive.94 However, Jus-
tice Kagan determined that Padilla was more than a straightforward ap-
plication of Strickland.95 Justice Kagan argued that before the Padilla
Court applied Strickland it first analyzed whether Strickland applied to
advisement about deportation, a collateral consequence of conviction.96 It
84. Id. at 898, 904.
85. Id. at 904.
86. Id.
87. United States v. Chaidez, No. 03 CR 636-6, 2010 WL 3979664, at *3-4 (N.D. 111. Oct. 6,
2010), rev'd, 655 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2011), af'd, 133 S. Ct. 1103 (2013).
88. Chaidez, 655 F.3d at 694.
89. Id. at 693.
90. Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1106 (2013) (quoting Chaidez, 655 F.3d at
691) (internal quotation marks omitted).
91. Id. (citing Chaidez, 655 F.3d at 697-99 (Williams, J., dissenting)).
92. Id. at H105.
93. Id. at 1107.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1108.
96. Id.
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was this preliminary analysis that Justice Kagan pointed to as breaking
new ground under Teague, by applying the Sixth Amendment to any
collateral consequence of conviction.
97
Justice Kagan began her analysis by discussing Hill v. Lockhart,
98
which extended the Sixth Amendment to the plea process.99 In that case,
the petitioner sought to have his conviction, obtained through a guilty
plea, overturned because his counsel provided inaccurate information
about parole eligibility. 1°° Applying Strickland to the petitioner's claim,
the Hill Court determined that Hill did not meet the second prong of the
test; the inaccurate information did not cause him prejudice. °1 Because
the petitioner failed to show prejudice, the Court did not determine
whether inaccurate information about parole eligibility constituted a vio-
lation of the Sixth Amendment guarantee to effective assistance of coun-
sel.102 Because the Hill Court did not determine whether inaccurate ad-
visement about a collateral consequence of conviction, parole eligibility,
constituted ineffective assistance of counsel, Justice Kagan did not con-
sider the divide between direct and collateral consequences to have been
breached. 103
Justice Kagan went on to argue that when the Padilla Court went
through a separate analysis of whether to apply Strickland to the issue of
advisement about immigration issues, the Court was acknowledging the
existence of the collateral distinction.104 It was this decision to apply
Strickland to a collateral consequence of conviction-deportation-that
Kagan argued broke new ground and created a new rule.105 The crux of
the majority's opinion in Chaidez is that prior to Padilla the Supreme
Court had never applied the Sixth Amendment to any collateral conse-
quence of a guilty plea.106 In deciding Padilla, Justice Kagan wrote, the
Court "breach[ed] the previously chink-free wall between direct and col-
lateral consequences."
' 107
D. Justice Thomas's Concurring Opinion
Justice Thomas joined in the dissent in Padilla.°8 He did not be-
lieve that the Sixth Amendment extended any requirements of counsel
97. Id. at II10.
98. Id. at 1108 (citing Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985)).
99. See Hill, 474 U.S. at 57.
100. See id. at 54-55.
101. Id. at 60.
102. See Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. at 1108.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 110.
105. Id. at 1110-1 .
106. See id.
107. Id. at 1110.
108. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 388 (2010).
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beyond "defense against prosecution of the charged offense."'1 9 Justice
Thomas argued that Padilla was wrongly decided. Justice Thomas be-
lieved there was no right to advisement about immigration issues for the
Court to apply "either prospectively or retrospectively.","0 Because he
believed the Court decided Padilla incorrectly, Justice Thomas argued
that a Teague analysis was unnecessary and concurred only in the judg-
ment in Chaidez."'1
E. Dissenting Opinion
Justice Sotomayor authored the dissent in Chaidez, which Justice
Ginsburg joined." 2 The dissent attacked Justice Kagan's contention that
a distinction between direct and collateral consequence xisted in Su-
preme Court precedent."13 Justice Sotomayor pointed out that many of
the lower court cases acknowledging a distinction between direct and
collateral consequences were decided prior the passage of IIRIRA in
1996.14 This is important, Justice Sotomayor argued, because the 1996
laws changed the professional norms regarding advisement about the
immigration consequences of a criminal conviction.' 15 Justice Sotomayor
considered the 2001 decision INS v. St. Cyr 116 to be a watershed decision
regarding advisement about immigration issues in the context of a crimi-
nal proceeding, and noted that after St. Cyr a majority of circuit courts
began acknowledging defense counsel's duty to inform clients about
deportation issues." 
7
The dissent in Chaidez argued that applying Strickland to the immi-
gration consequences of a conviction did not break new ground.1 8 In St.
Cyr, a case unrelated to the Sixth Amendment, the Court noted that com-
petent criminal defense counsel would advise a client about the deporta-
tion consequences of a guilty plea.1 9 Justice Sotomayor pointed to appel-
late court decisions in United States v. Kwan 20 and United States v. Cou-
to,121 each of which cited St. Cyr in applying Strickland to counsel mis-
statements about the deportation consequences of a guilty plea.122 In
109. Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. at 1114 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Padilla, 559 U.S. at 389)
(internal quotation mark omitted).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1114 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
113. See id. at 1117-18.
114. Id. at 1I18.
115. Id. at 1116.
116. 533 U.S. 289 (2001).
117. Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. at 1118 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
118. Seeid. atll20-21.
119. See id. at I Ill(majority opinion) (citing St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 323 n.50 (dealing with the
retroactivity of IIRIRA and AEDPA)).
120. 407 F.3d 1005 (9th Cir. 2005).
121. 311 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2002), abrogated by Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010).
122. See Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. at 1118 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing Kwan, 407 F.3d at
1015; Couto, 311 F.3d at 188).
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Kwan and Couto, federal circuit courts held that defense counsel's mis-
statements about immigration issues could constitute ineffective assis-
tance of counsel under Strickland. 123 However, where the Chaidez major-
ity saw Kwan and Couto as part of an established chain of precedent re-
garding attorney misstatements to a client,'24 the dissent instead saw a
clear precedent of applying Strickland to advisement about the immigra-
tion consequences of a criminal conviction. 1
25
Justice Sotomayor argued that the outcome of the Strickland test in
Padilla was dictated by the combination of precedent for applying Strick-
land to deportation issues and the change in prevailing professional
norms that requiring defense counsel to advise a client about deportation
after the 1996 changes in immigration law. With the outcome dictated by
the 1996 changes in immigration law and the change in prevailing pro-
fessional norms in response to that legislation, Padilla did not announce
a new rule under Teague and therefore should have been retroactive.126
III. ANALYSIS
In arguing that a "chink-free" wall between the direct and collateral
consequences of a criminal conviction existed prior to Padilla, Justice
Kagan ignored three lines of precedent that rendered the wall either non-
existent or thoroughly breached. The failure to acknowledge these prece-
dents led to the erroneous decision that Padilla does not apply retroac-
tively. First, the language of Padilla both denies the existence of Justice
Kagan's wall and indicates that the Court anticipated the Padilla decision
would be retroactive.127 Second, the Hill Court had applied the Strickland
test to the issue of advisement about parole eligibility, a collateral conse-
quence of criminal conviction, clearly breaching Justice Kagan's wall.
28
Finally, St. Cyr, Kwan, and Couto each recognized a criminal defend-
ant's right to information about the immigration consequences of a guilty
plea after 1996. 129 Individually, each line of precedent provides a signifi-
cant challenge to Justice Kagan's reasoning; taken together, the chal-
lenge is insurmountable.
Without the incorrect distinction between direct and collateral con-
sequences, the 1996 changes in immigration law clearly dictated the re-
sult of the Strickland analysis in Padilla. With the Padilla outcome dic-
tated, the Teague analysis in Chaidez should have resulted in the Padilla
ruling applying retroactively.
123. Id. (citing Kwan, 407 F.3d at 1015; Coulo, 311 F.3d at 188).
124. See id. at IIII n.12, 1112 (majority opinion).
125. See id. at 1118 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
126. See id. at 1120-21.
127. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 365, 371-72 (2010).
128. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58-60 (1985).
129. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 321-24 (2001); United States v. Kwan, 407 F.3d 1005, 1015
(9th Cir. 2005), abrogated by Padilla, 559 U.S. 356; United States v. Couto, 311 F.3d 179, 188 (2d
Cir. 2002), abrogated by Padilla, 559 U.S. 356.
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A. Padilla Said What?
The language of Padilla refutes two key elements of Justice Ka-
gan's reasoning. First, the Padilla Court flatly rejected the distinction
between collateral and direct consequences when it comes to Sixth
Amendment analysis.130 Second, the Padilla Court specifically acknowl-
edged the possibility of opening the door to future claims as a result of
granting Padilla's request.
131
1. Justice Stevens: What Wall?
When Justice Kagan argued that Padilla "breach[ed] the previously
chink-free wall between direct and collateral consequences," she quoted
the Padilla decision: "Strickland applies to Padilla's claim. ' 3 It is an
ironic choice of quotation because just two paragraphs earlier in the Pa-
dilla decision, Justice Stevens addressed the direct versus collateral dis-
tinction head-on: "We, however, have never applied a distinction be-
tween direct and collateral consequences to define the scope of constitu-
tionally 'reasonable professional assistance' required under Strick-
land." 133 Justice Stevens discussed how, aside from the general issue of
collateral versus direct consequences of conviction, deportation has a
unique relationship to criminal conviction for the defendant.134 Justice
Stevens also noted the century-long history of connecting immigration
status to criminal conviction.'35 According to the Padilla Court, the wall
that is the basic underpinning of the Chaidez decision did not exist.
2. Floodgates?
The plain language of Padilla anticipated retroactivity. 36 Although
it is dicta, Justice Stevens addressed the Government's concern that Pa-
dilla would open the floodgates to new claims.'37 Rather than arguing a
flood could not occur because Padilla would not be retroactive, the Court
pointed to the same concerns regarding the Hill decision.' Justice Ste-
vens assured the Government that, in spite of Hill being applied retroac-
tively, "[a] flood did not follow" because the prejudice prong of the
Strickland standard was such a high bar to overcome.139 This discussion
130. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 365.
131. Id. at 372-74.
132. Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1110(2013) (quoting Padilla, 559 U.S. at 366)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
133. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 365 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984)).
134. Id. at 365-66.
135. Id.
136. See id. at 371-72 (discussing the possibility of a flood of cases based on the ruling).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 371.
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demonstrates that the Padilla Court anticipated its holding would be ret-
roactive.
40
B. Hill v. Lockhart: Breaching the Direct Versus Collateral Distinction
Even if Justice Kagan's contention that there was a distinction be-
tween direct and collateral consequence is accepted, Hill v. Lockhart
breached it in 1985.141 The central underpinning of Justice Kagan's ar-
gument in Chaidez is that the application of the Strickland standard to
any collateral consequence of conviction was a departure from prece-
dent. 42 Justice Kagan noted that the Hill Court explicitly left open
whether Strickland applied to collateral consequences.143 The plain lan-
guage of Hill supports this proposition, and Hill declined to rule on the
issue of collateral consequences generally.'44 What Justice Kagan ig-
nored is that the Hill Court did perform a Strickland analysis on the issue
of advisement about parole eligibility. 145 Specifically, the Hill Court
found that the petitioner failed to meet the second prong of the Strickland
test.146 If Kagan's wall existed, the Hill Court could have simply dis-
missed the claim on the collateral distinction basis-it did not. 1
47
Justice Kagan pointed to Part II of Padilla, where the Court ana-
lyzed whether to apply Strickland, as an indication of breaking new
ground regarding collateral consequences.48 However, this ignored that
the Hill Court, without analyzing whether to apply Strickland, did apply
Strickland to the collateral consequence of parole eligibility. 49 Justice
Kagan's central point, that Padilla was the first case to apply Strickland
to a collateral consequence of a conviction, is simply erroneous. The Hill
Court breached the distinction over a quarter of a century earlier.
C. St. Cyr, Kwan, and Couto Recognize a Defendant's Right to Be In-
formed About the Immigration Consequences ofa Guilty Plea After
1996
The words of Justice William Brennan perfectly describe the error
Justice Kagan made in Chaidez: "[T]he Framers of
the Bill of Rights did not purport to 'create' rights. Rather, they designed
140. Spahn, supra note 29, at 796-97.
141. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56-60 (1985) (applying the Strickland test to counsel's
advice about parole eligibility, a collateral consequence).
142. Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1110 (2013).
143. Id. at 1108.
144. Hill, 474 U.S. at 60 ("We find it unnecessary to determine whether.., erroneous advice
by counsel as to parole eligibility may be deemed constitutionally ineffective assistance of coun-
sel.").
145. Id. at 58-59.
146. ld. at 60.
147. See Hill, 474 U.S. 52.
148. Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. at 1110.
149. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 371 (2010) ("We confronted a similar 'floodgates'
concern in Hill, but nevertheless applied Strickland to a claim that counsel had failed to advise the
client regarding his parole eligibility before he pleaded guilty." (citation omitted)).
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the Bill of Rights to prohibit our Government from infringing rights and
liberties presumed to be pre-existing."'
150
The Padilla decision did not create a right to information about the
immigration consequences of a guilty plea; rather, it recognized that right
as a manifestation of the Sixth Amendment after the 1996 immigration
laws went into effect. Three cases illustrate the recognition of that right
prior to Padilla's conviction. In St. Cyr, the Court acknowledged that the
1996 changes in immigration law altered the professional norms for
criminal defense counsel.151 Kwan and Couto each acknowledged this
right in relation to the Sixth Amendment. 15 Justice Kagan incorrectly
viewed these three cases as assigning an obligation on defense counsel,
rather than recognizing a right of criminal defendants.
1. The Court Recognizes the Impact of IIRIRA and AEDPA in St.
Cyr
St. Cyr is not a Sixth Amendment case; instead, it is a case about the
retroactivity of IIRIRA and AEDPA.153 However, referring to IIRIRA
and AEDPA, Justice Stevens wrote in his majority opinion,
"[C]ompetent defense counsel, following the advice of numerous prac-
tice guides, would have advised [a client] concerning the provision's
importance."1 54 While this quote is dicta, one can infer the Supreme
Court's recognition that after the 1996 immigration law changes, the
Sixth Amendment's guarantee of effective assistance of counsel includes
advisement about immigration consequences of criminal proceedings.
Even though St. Cyr is not a Sixth Amendment case, it is a clear
statement from the Court that 'effective assistance of counsel includes
advisement about the immigration ramifications of criminal proceedings
after the 1996 immigration laws became effective. Regardless of whether
this is an acknowledgment of a breach in Justice Kagan's wall or a
statement of the wall's nonexistence, it refutes the idea of a pristine dis-
tinction.
2. Kwan and Couto apply St. Cyr to the Sixth Amendment
While St. Cyr did not deal directly with the Sixth Amendment im-
plications of the 1996 immigration law changes, Kwan and Couto did.'55
Each decision noted that IIRIRA and AEDPA made deportation nearly
automatic following certain convictions.1 56 Because the consequence of
150. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 288 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
151. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 321, 323 n.50 (2001).
152. United States v. Kwan, 407 F.3d 1005, 1016 (9th Cir. 2005), abrogated by Padilla v.
Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010); United States v. Couto, 311 F.3d 179, 187-88 (2d Cir. 2002), abro-
gatedby Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010).
153. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 292-93.
154. Id. at 323 n.50.
155. Kwan, 407 F.3d at 1016; Couto, 311 F.3d at 187-88.
156. Kwan, 407 F.3d at 1008-09; Couto, 311 F.3d at 189-90.
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
deportation had become a nearly automatic result of certain criminal
convictions for noncitizen defendants, each decision held that Strickland
applies to defense counsel's misstatements about deportation.57 Both
decisions cited St. Cyr as acknowledgment by the Supreme Court of a
defendant's right to advisement about the immigration consequences of a
criminal conviction.' 
58
When viewed in the light of Kwan and Couto, the announcement in
Padilla essentially expanded the existing prohibition against misstate-
ments to include omissions: no misstatements (Kwan and Couto) or
omissions (Chaidez) about deportation.59 Justice Kagan argued that this
distinction has meaning; she placed Kwan and Couto in a line of cases
that prohibit attorney misstatements in general and gave no weight to the
cases' importance in recognizing the right of a criminal defendant to
information about the immigration consequences of a guilty plea.' 
60
Adding a prohibition against attorney omissions to an existing rule
prohibiting attorney misstatements about deportation, however, is only
significant if viewed from the attorney's side of the attorney-client equa-
tion. While there is admittedly a difference between requiring an attorney
to provide accurate information and prohibiting an attorney from provid-
ing inaccurate information, there is no difference from the point of view
of a criminal defendant: either way, the defendant lacks the necessary
information to make an informed decision. By viewing these obligations
from the vantage point of the attorney, Justice Kagan misinterpreted the
Sixth Amendment. The Sixth Amendment does not confer obligations
upon attorneys; it recognizes the rights of criminal defendants.
161
St. Cyr did not create an obligation that attorneys provide accurate
information about the immigration consequences of a guilty plea after the
1996 changes in the law; rather, it recognized that after the 1996 changes
in the law defendants have a right to accurate information about the im-
migration consequences of a guilty plea. This right is what ultimately
determines what information defense counsel has a duty to provide, not
the reverse. Jose Padilla had the right to advisement by counsel about the
immigration consequences of his guilty plea in 2002. The Supreme Court
recognized it and provided him the relief to which he was entitled.
157. Kwan, 407F.3dat 1015-16; Couto, 311 F.3d at 188.
158. Kwan, 407 F.3d at 1016; Couto, 311 F.3d at 187-88.
159. Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1118-19 (2013) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
160. Id. at 1112 (majority opinion).
161. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial,
by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been commit-
ted, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him;
to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assis-
lance of Counsel for his defence.
Id. (emphases added).
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Roselva Chaidez had the exact same right in 2003, but the Supreme
Court failed to recognize it and denied her the relief to which she was
entitled.
D. Strickland Dictated the Outcome in Padilla
Writing for the majority in Padilla, Justice Stevens specifically
pointed to IIRIRA and AEDPA as critical factors in the decision:
"[I]mportantly, recent changes in our immigration law have made re-
moval nearly an automatic result for a broad class of noncitizen offend-
ers."'162 The Court stated that because of the near automatic nature of the
consequence it was "'most difficult' to divorce the penalty from the con-
viction in the deportation context."'
' 63
With the wall between direct and collateral consequence either nev-
er having existed, or if it had, having been breached by the time of Pa-
dilla, the Court applied the first prong of the Strickland test: whether the
assistance of counsel was effective.164 Using the professional norms of
the time as the measuring stick, Strickland dictated that the Padilla Court
find counsel ineffective for failing to warn Padilla about the impact of a
guilty plea on his immigration status.'65 Professional norms are the
measuring stick of Strickland; when the norms changed in response to
the 1996 immigration law changes, that change dictated the outcome of
the Strickland test in Padilla.
E. The Supreme Court Should Have Found Padilla Retroactive Under
Teague in Chaidez
If a wall ever existed between direct and collateral consequences,'66
it was far from chink-free by the time Padilla was decided. Justice Ka-
gan emphasized the fact that the Padilla Court went through a separate
analysis to determine whether to apply Strickland.167 The point she ig-
nored was that the Padilla Court decided Strickland did apply-and fur-
ther noted that the prevailing professional norms dictated the outcome. 68
Applying the Sixth Amendment to collateral consequences was not
breaking new ground.
Without the distinction of direct versus collateral consequences to
cloud the issue, nothing else about the Padilla case was anything other
than a garden-variety application of Strickland.169 Padilla merely applied
162. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 366 (2010).
163. Id. (quoting United States v. Russell, 686 F.2d 35, 38 (D.C. Cir. 1982), abrogated by
Padilla, 559 U.S. 356).
164. Id.
165. See id. at 366-67.
166. See id. at 365 ("We, however, have never applied a distinction between direct and -collat-
eral consequences .... ).
167. Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1110 (2013).
168. See id. at 1114-15 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
169. Id. at 1114.
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the standard for effective counsel from Strickland to a new set of circum-
stances: the deportation consequences of a guilty plea-after the enact-
ment of the 1996 immigration laws.7 ° Under Teague, a rule that is the
result of applying established precedent to new circumstances is retroac-
tive; 17 1 the Chaidez dissent correctly concluded that this was the case
with the Padilla decision.
CONCLUSION
The Chaidez decision was an injustice. Had circumstances alerted
Roselva Chaidez to her deportation status earlier than it did, perhaps she
would have beaten Jose Padilla to the Supreme Court and received the
relief to which she was entitled. The Chaidez Court ignored the Hill, St.
Cyr, Kwan, and Couto decisions-and the language of the Padilla deci-
sion itself-when it determined that Padilla announced a new rule. Hill,
St. Cyr, Kwan, and Couto had already established a defendant's right to
information about the immigration consequences of a criminal convic-
tion. Precedent for applying Strickland to collateral consequences of a
criminal conviction, specifically immigration consequences, already ex-
isted. 172
If the chink-free wall between direct and collateral consequences
ever existed, it had gaping holes punched through it by the time of the
Padilla decision. The prevailing professional norms required criminal
defense counsel to advise a client about the deportation consequences of
a guilty plea. These two facts, when measured against Strickland, dictat-
ed the outcome in Padilla. Under Teague, a dictated outcome does not
establish a new rule. Because Padilla did not announce a new rule, its
holding should have applied retroactively to Roselva Chaidez.
Levi Price
170. Id. at 1115.
171. Id. at 1107 (majority opinion).
172. Id. at 1118 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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